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COURT ENCOUNTERS OF THE SLOWEST
KIND: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMORPHOUS
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
The right to a speedy trial is deeply entrenched in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.' The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial." 2 Although the principal purpose of the
sixth amendment is to protect the accused, the speedy trial right serves
additional social interests which often conflict with those of the defen-
dant. 3 Judicial attempts to reconcile these conflicts have consistently
rendered the speedy trial right relative rather than absolute. 4 Thus,
whether a delay violates the Constitution will depend on the circum-
stances of the particular case, the views of the trial judge, and the norm
for delay in the particular jurisdiction. 5 This inherent uncertainty has
been a source of criticism and motivated Congress to pass the Speedy
Trial Act,6 which strives for uniformity in the federal courts by imposing
a strict timetable for each stage of a criminal adjudication.
Since the Act does not apply to local courts, nonfederal speedy trial
claims must be resolved on a constitutional basis. Although the Supreme
Court, in Barker v. Wingo,7 articulated the test for the determination of a
1. The origins of the right to a speedy trial can be traced to the Magna Carta. See A.
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMMENTARY (1964). Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta
states: "To no one will We sell, to no one will We deny or delay, right or justice."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
3. Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the Lower Courts, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 11; see also Note, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Defining The Sixth
Amendment Right, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 130, 134 (1975). The Supreme Court has also
recognized important societal interests in having a speedy trial, such as restraining
convicted offenders and deterring future crime. Delays often impair the prosecution's
case and reduce the deterrent value of conviction. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 519-21 (1972); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86-87
(1905).
5. Note, supra note 3, at 144.
6. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. V 1975). For a statement of the
purpose of the legislation and the major issues considered in its passage, see H.R. REP.
No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974); see also 120 CONG. REC. S13, 176-77 (July 23,
1974). The intent of Congress to prod the federal judiciary into analyzing and resolving
sources of delay is clear.
7. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Catholic University Law Review
speedy trial deprivation, the amorphous nature of the factors to be
considered in this test has hindered uniformity among, as well as within,
the states. The lack of consistency with which the courts of the District
of Columbia have handled these cases illustrates the weaknesses of the
highly situational approach to the speedy trial right.
I. THE BURGER COURT BALANCE: Barker v. Wingo
The Supreme Court has always held that the right to a speedy trial is
relative rather than absolute, and therefore dependent upon the circum-
stances of the case. Since the Court's determination that the right to a
speedy trial is binding on the states,9 the Court has attempted to define
with some specificity the scope of the sixth amendment right. For exam-
ple, in 1971 the Court determined that the right to a speedy trial attached
when the defendant was "accused," either by the filing of formal
charges or by arresting and holding him to answer criminal charges.' 0
In early speedy trial cases, the Court required the accused to establish
a purposeful governmental delay as an element of deprivation of the
right." Today, bad faith is no longer required. Instead, in Barker v.
Wingo,' 2 the Court articulated a balancing test to reconcile the interests
of the accused with those of society. Despite a finding that the govern-
ment had a clear excuse for only seven months of the more than five
years between Barker's arrest and trial for murder, the Court concluded
that the defendant's speedy trial rights had not been violated since the
defendant was only minimally prejudiced and had acquiesced to much of
the delay.' 3 While reaffirming the relativity of the speedy trial right, the
Court identified four factors to be considered in determining whether
violations of the right have occurred: length of delay, reasons for delay,
assertion of the speedy trial right by the defendant, and prejudice to the
defendant. Although the length of delay is, to some extent, a triggering
mechanism,' 4 none of these factors is "either a necessary or sufficient
8. See, e.g., Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
9. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). The Court concluded that "the
right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment" and is, therefore, binding on the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 223.
10. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Although the sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial does not attach until accusation, a defendant may have due process rights
to the prompt disposition of his case prior to accusation. See Favors v. Eyman, 466 F.2d
1325 (9th Cir. 1972).
II. See, e.g., Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1957).
12. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
13. Id. at 533-36.
14. Id. at 530.
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condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial."' 5
Additionally, the Court specifically rejected the argument, previously
accepted in most jurisdictions, 16 that a defendant waives his right to a
speedy trial for the period of time prior to his assertion of the right.
Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that a defendant could still waive his
right to a speedy trial for all or part of the delay, and that the force and
frequency of the defendant's assertion of the right were elements to be
considered in the balance.
17
In a subsequent decision, the Court concluded that the appropriate
remedy for a violation of speedy trial rights was dismissal of the charges
with prejudice, thereby foreclosing further prosecution. 8 The severity
of this remedy, which has been criticized as "draconian"' 9 and "more
serious than an exclusionary rule' 20 explains the reluctance of the courts
to find speedy trial deprivations. Given the flexibility of the Barker
balancing test and the scarcity of Supreme Court cases explaining it,
local courts have been left with broad discretion in implementing the
test. A court may tip the balance by concluding that a given factor should
be heavily weighted in one case, but not in another. Comparatively
balancing the factors on an ad hoc basis also results in inconsistent and
sometimes incompatible decisions which make an accused's right to a
speedy trial even more relative. An examination of the recent speedy
trial cases in the courts of the District of Columbia illustrates the inter-
play of the Barker factors and some of the weaknesses of the balancing
approach.
II. A SPEEDY TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
Branch v. United States
The most recent controversial speedy trial case is Branch v. United
States,21 in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, relying on
the local practice of shifting the burden of proof in cases involving delays
over one year, 22 held that a sixteen-month delay from arrest to trial
15. Id. at 533.
16. Prior to Barker only eight states had rejected this demand-waiver doctrine. The
remaining jurisdictions employed numerous variations of the rule. See id. at 524 nn.20-22.
17. Id. at 531. The Court stated, "We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who
fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right.." Id. at 528. However, the Court
concluded, "We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove he was denied a speedy trial." Id. at 532.
18. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 376 A.2d 434, 437 (D.C. 1977).
20. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 522.
21. 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
22. For a more complete analysis of delays longer than one year, see notes 85-87 &
accompanying text infra.
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shifted the burden of justifying the delay to the government. The govern-
ment objected on the theory that the defendant was not "accused" for
four and a half months between the dismissal of one indictment and the
filing of the second. By excluding this period, the net delay from arrest to
trial was less than twelve months, too short to shift the burden. The court
rejected this argument, concluding that the government intentionally
delayed reindicting the defendant. 23 Holding the government responsible
for the delay, the court reversed Branch's conviction for second degree
burglary. The court found that Branch had been prejudiced in three
ways: he was incarcerated for nine of the sixteen months between arrest
and trial; he had suffered anxiety, although no overt manifestations or
specific instances were alleged; and his defense was impaired because
the passage of time affected the memory of one witness and made it
impossible to locate another. In placing the burden of proof on the
government, the Branch court held that "it is impossible on the record to
say that the passage of time did not impair appellant's defense."
24
No other District of Columbia case has gone as far as Branch in
making the right to a speedy trial absolute rather than relative. Although
Branch applied the Barker balance, it placed a greater burden on the
government than ever before. 25 However, to some extent, the decision
may have turned on the deliberateness of the government's delay.
26
The cases since Branch have reflected a more reserved approach by
the appellate court. In United States v. Perkins,27 the court refused to
shift the burden of proof to the government after a pretrial delay of
slightly less than a year despite a conclusion that the delay "seem[ed]
excessive." 2 8 Applying the Barker balance, the appellate court focused
23. 372 A.2d at 1001.
24. Id. at 1002.
25. In Branch, the court required the government to prove that the delay did not
prejudice the defendant. Thus, the government had the burden of showing that the
defendant did not suffer anxiety over the possibility of reindictment, that eight months
pretrial incarceration was not oppressive, and that the disappearance and loss of memory
of defense witnesses was not prejudicial to the defendant. Furthermore, analogizing
Branch to a case involving bad faith, United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
the court impliedly required the government to prove its own good faith. Although never
specifically finding bad faith, the Branch court concluded that the government's delays
were "deliberate and unjustified." 372 A.2d at 1001.
26. In Branch, the court analogized the delay to that in United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d
460 (D.C. Cir. 1975), which involved bad faith. Clearly the Branch court shifted a heavy
burden to the government, but whether any circumstances could justify bad faith has not
yet been resolved.
27. 374 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1977).
28. Id. at 885. The trial court had concluded that the defendant, charged with two
misdemeanors, possession of a prohibited weapon (a blackjack) and carrying a deadly
weapon, had been denied his speedy trial rights. Id. at 883.
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primarily on the reasons for the delay29 and the issue of prejudice, and
concluded that the defendant's speedy trial rights had not been denied.
31
Notwithstanding the trial court decision to the contrary, and the seem-
ingly excessive delay for a misdemeanor, the appellate court found a
"clear lack of substantial prejudice to the [defendant]." 31
In other decisions, the court of appeals paid lip service to Branch by
claiming to shift the burden of proof to the government, but placed little
or no actual burden on the government, thus rendering the shift meaning-
less. In United States v. Clark,32 although the trial court had found
government obduracy in pursuing a grand jury subpoena which resulted
in ten months of litigation, "the appellate court decided that the govern-
ment-induced delay was not to be accorded the heavy weight assigned to
intentional delays." 33 The court concluded that the defendant had suf-
fered no clear prejudice since he was free on his own recognizance and
had failed to establish how the delay impaired his defense or how the
anxiety he allegedly experienced "weighed particularly heavily on him in
specific instances." 34 Although the Clark court concluded that the gov-
ernment had "sufficiently justified the delay," 35 it is questionable
whether the court actually shifted the burden to the government.
The question of who should be "charged" with a particular delay may
be important in determining whether to shift the burden, as well as in
determining whether the speedy trial right has been violated. In Wash-
ington v. United States ,36 the appellate court refused to shift the burden
to the government, although slightly over one year had elapsed from
arrest to trial, because two months of the delay were attributed to the
defendant when he changed counsel. In applying the Barker factors, the
court then indicated that the defendant's belated assertion of the speedy
trial right and failure to assert prejudice were insufficient to establish a
speedy trial violation.
37
29. The Perkins court held the defendant responsible for a two month delay to allow
transfer of the case to another student attorney, even though the transfer was necessitated
by delays caused by court congestion, chargeable to the government. Id. at 883 & n.4.
30. Id.
3 1. Id. at 885. The Perkins court treated the issue of prejudice very differently than did
the Branch court. In Branch, prejudice was presumed and the government had the burden
of attempting to show that it did not exist.
32. 376 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1977).
33. Id. at 437.
34. Id. at 436, quoting Morns v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 925 (1975).
35. Id. at 437.
36. 377 A.2d 1348 (D.C. 1977).
37. Id. at 1352.
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In many cases the court has concluded that the defendant has waived
his right to a speedy trial for portions of the delay. In Chatman v. United
States,38 which involved a sixteen-month delay from arrest to trial, two
defendants charged with serious felonies made explicit waivers of all
delays after the first year. Because of the waivers and because some of
the delays during the first twelve months were attributable to the defend-
ants, the court refused to shift the burden to the government. Since the
defendants failed to allege prejudice with particularity, the court
concluded that the defendants' speedy trial rights had not been denied.
Such a waiver of the speedy trial right need not be express. For
example, Cates v. United States39 involved a delay of almost five years
between arrest and trial for assault, and all but four months were at-
tributable to the defendant. The court indicated that the defendant had
waived his right to a speedy trial for this period and rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the government should be charged with the delay on
the theory that the government did not make a good faith effort to find
him. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the govern-
ment acted in bad faith. While its conclusions were sound, the court's
opinion lacked clarity on the issue of shifting the burden of proof.
Specifically, the court claimed to shift the burden of proof to the govern-
ment because the total delay was over twelve months, even though the
delay attributable to the government was less than a year.40 Such an
approach is inconsistent with Washington and Chatman, since the court
refused to shift the burden of proof in those cases despite delays of over
one year because the length of delay attributable to the government was
less than one year. In light of the court's determination that Cates had
not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, however, the purported
shift of the burden in Cates may simply reflect excessive judicial zeal
rather than a significant change in the court's approach to speedy trial
cases.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BARKER BALANCE BY THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS
If the speedy trial right is to be meaningful, there must be a degree of
predictability in the resolution of speedy trial claims. Since decisions
turn on the balancing of the particular circumstances of each case, it is
important that the courts weigh the individual elements of the balance
consistently. A factor-by-factor analysis of recent District of Columbia
38. 377 A.2d 1155 (D.C. 1977).
39. 379 A.2d 968, 972 (D.C. 1977) (fugitive used assumed names to avoid apprehen-
sion).
40. Id. at 970.
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Court of Appeals decisions suggests, however, that such consistency is
lacking.
A. Length of the Delay
The length of the delay is considered twice under the Barker approach,
first as a triggering mechanism and then again as one of the elements in
the balance. In Barker the Supreme Court stated that "[u]ntil there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. ,41 However, the
phrase "presumptively prejudicial" is misleading because the initial
delay necessary to trigger a speedy trial analysis does not create a
presumption that the defendant has suffered prejudice. Instead, the
delay merely signals that an investigation into the other factors is war-
ranted, and that the length of time from accusation 42 to trial, sufficient to
trigger an application of the Barker balance, will vary with the nature of
the offense. 43 Although the length of this triggering time for any given
offense is a source of controversy among the jurisdictions, the majority
of courts will apply the Barker balance to delays of more than one year in
cases involving simple crimes."
The courts in the District of Columbia subject all but the shortest
delays to the complete Barker analysis. Although delays ranging from a
few days to several months have been held insufficient to trigger the
analysis, 45 the courts generally scrutinize delays exceeding six months if
a speedy trial claim is asserted. 46 Both local and federal courts in the
41. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
42. See note 10 supra. A defendant may have a sixth amendment speedy trial right for
periods when he is not technically accused. E.g., United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977). In both Branch and
Lara the courts considered the time between the dismissal of one indictment and the filing
of a second indictment as government delay although the defendants were arguably not
technically accused during this period.
43. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530-31; United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d at 463.
44. See Rudstein, supra note 3, at 17. Rudstein contends that a lapse of one year is
considered sufficient to trigger an analysis of the Barker factors in almost all adjudica-
tions, regardless of the nature of the offense charged. Furthermore, he also notes that
jurisdictions will often subject delays of less than one year to the Barker balance. Id.
45. See Parry-Hill v. District of Columbia, 291 A.2d 505, 507 (D.C. 1972). The court
concluded that a delay of five days was not sufficient to trigger an investigation of a denial
of speedy trial when the defendant was charged with only misdemeanors. See also
Henson v. United States, 287 A.2d 106 (D.C. 1972) (a delay of less than five weeks was
insufficient for a defendant charged with obtaining property under false pretenses).
46. See United States v. Perkins, 374 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1977) (49 week delay); Moore v.
United States, 359 A.2d 299 (D.C. 1976) (eight month delay).
However, in at least two cases local courts have examined the merits of cases involving
19781
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District of Columbia employ a general rule that the longer the delay and
the less serious the offense, the more "presumptively prejudicial" the
delay .
47
Once the analysis has been triggered, the length of delay is again
considered. A delay of more than one year establishes a prima facie case
of speedy trial deprivation and should shift to the government the burden
of justifying the delay and showing lack of prejudice to the defendant.48
The longer the delay, the heavier the burden on the government. While
this shifting of the burden of proof based on the length of delay is unique
to the District of Columbia,49 some recent opinions suggest that shifting
the burden to the government is merely pro forma.5 0
B. Reasons for the Delay
Although the ultimate responsibility for bringing a defendant to trial
rests with the government rather than the accused, 51 a defendant can
waive his right to a speedy trial by his own delays. 52 It is often difficult to
allocate responsibility for a particular delay or determine how various
delays are to be weighted. In Barker, the Court reasoned that some
delays should be weighted more heavily against the government than
others. Thus an intentional delay by the prosecution should be weighted
more heavily than court overcrowding or negligence, while an appropri-
ate delay for a valid reason should not be charged against the government
at all.53
There is an unresolved controversy in the District of Columbia courts
surrounding government delays involving bad faith. In Barker, the Su-
preme Court indicated that "[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
delays of less than six months. See United States v. Kramer, 286 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1972)
(four month delay); United States v. Jones, 254 A.2d 412 (D.C. 1969)(delays ranging from
36-83 days).
47. See United States v. Holt, 448 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942
(1971); Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
48. United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Branch v. United States,
372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
49. The vast majority of jurisdictions refuse to shift the burden of proof to the
government regardless of the length of the delay. Instead, these jurisdictions require the
defendant to prove that the delay resulted in actual prejudice. See Rudstein, supra note 3,
at 41-42.
50. See text accompanying notes 80-87 infra; Cates v. United States, 379 A.2d 968
(D.C. 1977); United States v. Clark, 376 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1977).
51. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Court reasoned that "a] more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Id. at 531.
52. Id. at 529.
53. Id. at 531.
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order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government," but that intentional delays per se do not automatically
require a finding of speedy trial infringement. 54 However, precedents in
the District of Columbia suggest that government delays indicating bad
faith are not justifiable under any circumstances.15 This issue is obfus-
cated by the courts' failure to articulate definitions, so that bad faith can
be distinguished from intentional delay.
That subtle distinctions in weighting the delay can determine the
outcome of a case is apparent from United States v. Clark.56 The trial
court dismissed charges of second degree murder on the basis of its
finding of "obduracy on the part of the prosecution in obtaining docu-
ments which merely reiterated information already made available to the
grand jury . . . . 5 The trial court found that the subpoena was unjus-
tified and that the government was proceeding in bad faith when the
prosecution sought a writ of mandamus to overturn the trial court's
quashing of the subpoena. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
finding of bad faith, concluding that the delay was "not to be accorded
the heavy weight assigned to intentional delay." 58 After rebalancing the
factors, the court reversed the dismissal.
Cases involving court-appointed counsel and public defenders present
particular problems since the government is responsible for both prose-
cution and defense. In United States v. Calhoun," the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals held the defendant responsible for delays caused by
the lack of proper funding and staffing of the public defender investiga-
tive services. The appellate court also charged the defendant with the
three month delay caused by the court's removal of an inept defense
lawyer from the case and the reappointment of another attorney. The
trial court had held the government responsible for both delays. 60 In
another recent case, 6' the defense was charged with the delay resulting
from the transferral of the case to another student attorney even though
the transfer was due to a government delay. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took the opposite approach
in United States v. Sarvis,62 attributing delays caused by the successive
54. Id.
55. See United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998, 1001
(D.C. 1977).
56. 376 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1977).
57. Id. at 437.
58. Id. at 437, quoting United States v. Sarvis, 523 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59. 363 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1976).
60. Id. at 279.
61. United States v. Perkins, 374 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1977).
62. 523 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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appointments of defense counsel to the government when these delays
were the result of scheduling problems of the lawyers rather than the
defendant. Since the interests of the defendant and his counsel are not
always identical, the Sarvis approach is not unreasonable. Justice
White's concurring opinion in Barker offers support for this view since
he indicated that the crucial factor in attributing responsibility for delays
was the defendant's intent. 63 Since delays caused by understaffing in the
prosecutor's office are charged to the government, 64 the more prophy-
lactic view would charge the government with delays caused by ineffec-
tive government-appointed counsel as well. However, it is doubtful that
the Sarvis rule will be widely followed because of the reluctance of
courts to find speedy trial violations which necessitate either dismissal of
untried charges with prejudice or reversal of convictions.
Some difficulty has arisen in allocating responsibility for delays in-
volving appeals. Both local and federal courts agree- that appellate delay
is ultimately the responsibility of the government, but, absent intentional
delay, do not weight it heavily. 65 The District of Columbia Superior
Court handled the issue in an unusual manner in United States v. Ander-
son. 66 While nominally holding the government responsible for the de-
lay, the court denied, without prejudice, defendant's motion for dismiss-
al on speedy trial grounds, thus allowing the case to be tried and the
motion revived if the defendant were convicted. 67 This approach to
speedy trial cases should be closely scrutinized since interlocutory ap-
peals taking several years are not unusual. Moreover, this deferred
remedy is arguably an emasculation of the defendant's right to a speedy
trial because the defendant may suffer prejudice through incarceration,
anxiety, and impairments to his defense and still be foreclosed from the
recognized remedy of dismissal.
C. Assertion of the Right
Although Barker brought an end to the demand-waiver doctrine, a
63. "[U]nreasonable delay . . . cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public
resources provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited .... "Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 538 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973).
65. See generally United States v. Sarvis, 523 F.2d 1177, 1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Perry, 353 F. Supp. 1235, 1238-39 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Clark,
376 A.2d 434, 437 (D.C. 1977).
66. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 601 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977).
67. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 607-08. The superior court based its decision to adopt
this procedure on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332
(1975) (the Supreme Court impliedly sanctioned a trial court's deferral of the defendant's
due process claim until after the jury found the defendant guilty).
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defendant's assertion of his desire for a speedy trial is still a factor to be
considered in the balancing test.' Although courts will not generally
assume that a defendant has waived a constitutional right through si-
lence,69 a defendant who does not assert his desire for a speedy trial
stands little hope for success. In mitigation, most courts, including those
of the District of Columbia, are willing to consider virtually any attempt
by a defendant to initiate judicial proceedings to be an assertion of the
right.70 For example, a speedy trial motion filed with the wrong court,71
and a motion for release from incarceration 72 have both been sufficient
assertions of the right. Both the local and federal courts in the District of
Columbia have held that when the defendant is incarcerated, the govern-
ment must assume he wants a speedy trial unless he asserts otherwise.73
Although the courts in the District of Columbia are reluctant to find
that a defendant has waived his right in all but the most blatant cases,74
courts examine the force and frequency of the assertions in the balancing
process. In Calhoun, the court of appeals held that an "assertion of [the]
right to a speedy trial after either initiating or consenting to several
continuances is not . . . entitled to strong evidentiary weight." 75 Thus,
an assertion which appears to be merely pro forma will carry little weight
with the courts.76
D. Prejudice
The final element of the Barker balance is prejudice to the defendant.
68. See notes 16-17 & accompanying text supra.
69. See generally Barker v . Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972); Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v.
Calloway, 505 F.2d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. See Rudstein, supra note 3, at 36-37.
71. One of the defendants in Anderson filed his motion for a speedy trial with the trial
court. It was later determined that the correct forum was the appellate court, yet in
reviewing his speedy trial claim the superior court specifically held that neither defendant
had waived his right. United States v. Anderson, 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 601,607 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1977).
72. United States v. Calloway, 505 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 317; Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
74. In Cates v. United States, the court of appeals held that the defendant had waived
his right to a speedy trial for the 55 months he evaded justice through flight and the use of
aliases. 379 A.2d 968 (D.C. 1977). Furthermore, explicit waivers made in court with the
advice of counsel are clearly sufficient to waive the right. Chatman v. United States, 377
A.2d 1155 (D.C. 1977).
75. 363 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C. 1976).
76. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Rudstein, supra note 3, at 39. In
rejecting the demand-waiver doctrine, the Barker Court stated that the new balancing test
would "allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to
attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection." Id. at 529.
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The Barker Court determined that the right to a speedy trial was design-
ed to protect against three types of prejudice: oppressive pretrial incar-
ceration, anxiety while awaiting trial, and the impairment of a defense. 7
The Court also considered an impaired defense the most serious form of
prejudice, although not a condition precedent to speedy trial relief.78
Courts recognize that an impaired defense is often difficult to prove
since "what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. "
79
The Barker decision is often criticized for its vagueness on the issue of
which party has the burden of proving prejudice. 80 In speedy trial cases,
the vast majority of jurisdictions place the burden of proving prejudice
on the defendant. 8' This is contrary to the general rule that the govern-
ment has the burden of showing a lack of prejudice when other constitu-
tional rights are violated. 82 This distinction between the right to speedy
trial and other constitutional rights may be caused by two factors. While
violations of some other constitutional rights are often considered harm-
less if the error does not prejudice the defense,83 the speedy trial right is
of such a fundamental nature that its deprivation has never been con-
sidered a harmless error. Additionally, since prejudice is considered in
determining whether a deprivation of speedy trial rights has occurred, a
lack of prejudice cannot be alleged once the violation has been estab-
lished.
The District of Columbia courts handle the issue of prejudice in an
77. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
78. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973).
79. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.
80. See Rudstein, supra note 3, at 41; see also The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 170-71 (1972); 58 CORNELL L. REV. 399, 409-10 (1973).
81. See Rudstein, supra note 3, at 41:
The overwhelming majority of courts have required the accused to show actual
prejudice in order for this factor of the balancing process to be weighed in his
favor. . . .In only a few cases have the courts either presumed prejudice from a
lengthy delay, or shifted the burden of proof after a prima facie showing by the
defendant of the possibility of prejudice.
82. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court articulated a test
for harmless error. Under this test, a deprivation of constitutional rights can only be
harmless if the state can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional
error did not prejudice the defendant by contributing to his conviction. Id. at 24. In
Chapman, the Court reversed the defendants' convictions and granted them a new trial
because the state failed to meet this burden. Id. at 26.
83. In Chapman, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that all federal
constitutional errors must always be deemed grounds for reversal. "We conclude that
there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id. at 22.
However, the Court went on to underscore the correctness of its previous holdings that
"there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error." Id. at 23.
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unusual manner by shifting the burden from the defendant to the govern-
ment for delays longer than one year. 84 In application, this rule has
become so muddled that there are few generalizations which can be
drawn with any certainty. If the total time from arrest to trial is less than
one year, the defendant must bear the burden of showing prejudice.8 5 In
at least one case involving total delays of more than one year, the court
of appeals shifted the burden of proof to the government without specif-
ically attributing responsibility to the government for the delay.8 6 But
when the total time from arrest to trial is more than one year, and the
amount of delay attributable to the government is less than one year,
decisions of the court of appeals have been inconsistent.8 7 The decisions
handed down within the past year suggest that the court of appeals may
be divided on the issue of how and when the burden of proof should be
shifted to the government.
Another unresolved consideration is the manner in which local courts
should handle prejudicial anxiety. Given the amorphous nature of anx-
iety, it is easy to appreciate the difficulty of resolving its existence and
extent. Since the Supreme Court seems to have relegated this type of
prejudice to a secondary status, compared with defense impairment or
oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety seldom appears determinative
in the balancing process.
88
The extent to which a defendant must show how any delay weighed
particularly heavily on him in specific instances is unclear in the District
of Columbia courts.89 This situation may reflect the confusion surround-
84. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 448 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1971); United States v. Mack, 298 A.2d 509, 511 (D.C. 1972).
85. See United States v. Perkins, 374 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1977).
86. In Branch, which involved a total delay of sixteen months, the D.C. Court of
Appeals shifted a heavy burden to the government without determining what portion of
the delay was chargeable to the government. 372 A.2d at 1000-01.
87. Clark involved a total delay of seventeen months. Without specifically determining
what portion of the delay was chargeable to the government, the court claimed to shift the
burden to the government. 376 A.2d at 437. However, a close reading of the case suggests
that the court never effectively shifted any burden to the government, despite the fact that
the court specifically found that the defendant had not waived his speedy trial rights and
that the government was chargeable with at least the ten month period spent litigating the
propriety of a grand jury subpoena. Id. at 436.
In Washington v. United States, 377 A.2d 1348, 1352 (D.C. 1977), and in Chatman v.
United States, 377 A.2d 1155, 1156-57 (D.C. 1977), the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to
shift the burden of proof to the government when the total delay was over one year, but
the delay attributable to the government was less than one year. Finally in Cates v. United
States, 379 A.2d 968 (D.C. 1977), the D.C. Court of Appeals claimed to shift the burden to
the government for a delay of over one year despite the fact that delay chargeable to the
government was only four months. Id. at 970.
88. Rudstein, supra note 3, at 48.
89. Compare Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977) (finding of anxiety
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ing the burden of proof issue generally. Nonetheless, the manner in
which the trial courts should examine how anxiety affected a particular
defendant is also unresolved. In Moore v. United States,90 the court of
appeals refused even to consider the defendant's allegation that he
suffered anxiety from the threat of homosexual assaults during incarcer-
ation, while the court in United States v. Perkins9' did weigh, but reject-
ed, arguments that the defendant's alleged prejudicial anxiety was
caused by disrupting his work-study program for repeatedly postponed
court appearances. Similarly, the court of appeals has refused to give
consideration to the alleged special anxiety suffered by a police officer
when charges threatened his career, 92 yet has recognized the special
impact of the revocation of a cabdriver's license pending the disposition
of the criminal charges against the driver. 93 Factors outside of the nature
and extent of the alleged anxiety appear to weigh more heavily in deter-
mining the final outcome of each case. 94
IV. CONCLUSION
The adjudication of speedy trial claims in the District of Columbia
lacks consistency in several important respects, especially in the treat-
ment of the prejudice factor. Such inconsistency eliminates predictabil-
ity and thus undermines the protection the sixth amendment was intend-
ed to assure.
A relative right to speedy trial, such as currently offered under the
Barker balance, can never offer an accused the concrete protections
present under a strict statutory scheme. However, a balancing approach
has the advantage of permitting the tribunal to consider the particular
circumstances of the case and to resolve the often conflicting interests of
the accused and society as the existing variables of the case require.
based on the bare allegation of the defendant) with United States v. Clark, 376 A.2d 434
(D.C. 1977) (claim of anxiety by itself does not establish prejudice if the defendant neither
asserts nor shows that the delay weighed particularly heavily on him in specific instances).
90. 359 A.2d 299, 303 (D.C. 1976).
91. 374 A.2d 882, 885 (D.C. 1977).
92. United States v. Kramer, 286 A.2d 856, 859-61 (D.C. 1972).
93. United States v. Young, 237 A.2d 542, 544 (D.C. 1968).
94. See note 88 & accompanying text supra. United States v. Young, 237 A.2d 542
(D.C. 1968), constitutes the high-water mark for the deference given to anxiety by the
District of Columbia courts. The court's finding of a deprivation of speedy trial rights
rested, to a large extent, on its conclusion that "prolonging the anxiety and concern
unreasonably and extending the oppression that may accompany criminal prosecution can
sometimes constitute a denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial." Id. at 544.
However, the precedential value of Young is questionable since the decision was prior to
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), in which the Court considered anxiety to be
somewhat less significant than other forms of prejudice.
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In light of judicial reluctance to apply the severe remedy of dismissal
with prejudice, and the uncertainty inherent in the balancing process, the
consistency with which the courts implement the balance gains special
importance. Since a cumulative, outcome-determinative approach will
relegate the speedy trial right to a mere paper status, it is paramount that
courts examine and weigh each element of the balance in an independent
and consistent manner.
J. J. Cranmore
